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Everybody knows that Big Data has become a significant political issue, but few of us 
would be able to make sense of the claim that data is inherently political. If data is political, 
one would assume this has more to do with what certain actors – governments, corpora-
tions and hackers – are now able to do with data than the actual data itself. In How We 
Became Our Data: A Genealogy of the Informational Person, Colin Koopman argues that data 
is not only inherently political, but that there is a profound sense in which our subjectivity 
has been reshaped by data. In fact, he claims that we have become our data.   
This claim is supported by two ‘corollary’ arguments (11). The first argument is that 
there is a distinctive form of power ‘that organizes a politics of informational persons’ 
(10). According to Koopman, this ‘infopower’ is a distinct modality of power that is exer-
cised through the work of ‘formatting’ – the various techniques that ‘shape, constrain, and 
prepare whatever is collected, stored, processed, refined, retrieved, and redistributed as 
information’ (12). For Koopman, the ‘paradigmatic instantiation’ of formatting is the 
checkbox-and-blank form, as it is ‘among the most ubiquitous of shapes into which we 
regularly squeeze ourselves’ (12). Such an act of formatting serves to ‘fasten’ subjects to 
their data – that is to say, that acts of formatting bound subjects to their data in a way that 
changes what it is possible for them to be or to do (12). For Koopman, ‘fastening’ is an 
operation of power that serves both to ‘tie us down’ and ‘speed us up’ (12). He allows 
both meanings to accrue throughout the book, and it becomes clear that each effect serves 
to intensify the other. The more tightly we are bound to our data, the more quickly data 
can multiply, and the more easily we are able to move through the rapidly expanding 
infrastructure created by information. In this way, to be an informational person is to be 
‘inscribed, processed, and reproduced’ as a subject of data – a form of subjectivity that is 
enabled by techniques of formatting and constituted through operations of fastening (4).                   
To support this first argument, Koopman claims that the unique character of infopower 
is tied to a very specific historical moment, and that its status as a distinct analytic of 
power can only be revealed through a genealogy of the informational person (11). Conse-
quently, the first part of the book is dedicated to showing how infopower emerged as a 
historically specific phenomenon. Koopman’s genealogy begins in the early decades of 
the twentieth century, a moment when ‘information began to precede the person’ and it 
became ‘possible for information to draw up persons as if out of nowhere’ (6). It is the 
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moment just before information became a ‘universal’ feature of our lives – something that 
is ‘increasingly behind, underneath, and within all that we dream to do and all that we do 
in fact do’ (10). Indeed, the main purpose of his genealogy is to show how information 
came to function as a ‘historical universal’ in our society and culture (10).  
The genealogy traces out three different ‘histories of information’ that are characteristic 
of this period. Each of these histories is concerned with new forms of identity that together 
comprise the informational person: documentary identity, psychological identity and ra-
cial identity. Through each of these histories, Koopman shows how information is politi-
cal at the level of formatting and design, despite being presented as a technical achieve-
ment devoid of prejudice or evaluative judgment.   
Koopman’s discussion of documentary identity focuses on the successful attempt in 
the United States to make birth registration universal (35 – 65). This project was initiated 
in 1903 by the Census Bureau and was completed around 1935 with the help of the Chil-
dren’s Bureau and the American Child Health Association (58). He identifies three explicit 
motivations for this undertaking: the desire to track the movement of individuals, to man-
age public health more effectively, and to protect the legal rights of individuals and the 
community (41). As Koopman concedes, this set of concerns might seem to lend itself to 
an analysis in terms of either biopower or sovereign power (42). Whilst these forms of 
power are certainly in operation here, Koopman insists that infopower is also working as 
a distinct ‘layer’ of power that served to format persons and enable their participation in 
an emerging informational infrastructure (42). The birth certificate is the first document 
that fastened the informational person to the ‘specific data points around which their sub-
sequent life could be accumulated’ (44). Whilst certain ‘data points’ like ‘ascribed race’ are 
more obviously implicated in ‘enduring oppressions’, birth certificates serve a more gen-
eral function in fastening us to the assemblage of data that allows us to move through the 
world – our social security numbers, passports, driver’s licenses, bank accounts and uni-
versity transcripts (44, ix). Therefore, the birth certificate serves as the cornerstone of our 
dependency on data, allowing human life to be interpolated within the ever-expanding 
matrix of information.   
Koopman’s analysis of psychological identity is based on an inquiry into the ‘informat-
ics of psychological traits’ that stabilized between 1917 and 1937 (66 – 107). Koopman 
traces the emergence of ‘personality’ as a concept in French ‘abnormal psychology’ during 
the nineteenth century through to its introduction into American psychology by William 
James, before detailing how the desire to ‘objectively’ measure personality traits en-
trenched the notion of personality we are familiar with today (88). In fact, Koopman main-
tains there is a sense in which we didn’t have ‘personalities’ until we became our data 
(166 – 167). On his reading, there was no way to understand ourselves in terms like ‘ex-
troversion’ or ‘introversion’ prior to the consolidation of these categories on the basis of 
empirical results obtained through personality tests (107). In this way, the very terms in 
which we today think about ourselves and others were established by the specific project 
of formatting human psychology.  
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Finally, Koopman’s account of racial identity focuses on the emergence of ‘redlining’ 
in the 1920s and 30s – the practice of ‘denying home loan applications based on the racial 
characteristics of a property’s neighborhood’ (108). By presenting race as an informational 
input that was ostensibly neutral, the Federal Housing Administration was able to en-
trench a new form of systemic oppression by claiming to adhere to objective standards of 
valuation. This practice was made possible by the real estate industry’s decision to include 
the racial composition of neighborhoods on their appraisal forms (140 – 141). Once this 
input became part of their standardized method of valuation, it became difficult to see 
that the formatting of race was not merely a technical requirement, but a political choice. 
Koopman’s treatment of the early twentieth century doesn’t claim to be exhaustive, but 
it does seek to highlight three important ways in which our subjectivity continues to be 
shaped by these moments of ‘stabilization’ (177). In this respect, Koopman’s discussion of 
‘redlining’ is especially interesting. He argues that the practice was facilitated by an ‘in-
formatics of race’ that ‘reformatted long-standing racial differences as distinctions in data’ 
and installed a unique form of ‘technological racism’ (110, 113). For Koopman, this sort of 
racial data is ‘doubly political’ – that is to say, there is a political dimension to racial data 
that exceeds the way in which race is ‘ineluctably political’ to begin with (114). With this 
in mind, Koopman argues that ‘racial identity has been made to depend at least in part on 
data’ in a way that is distinct from more easily recognizable forms of racialization (11). 
This specific act of formatting enabled the possibility of a data analytics that ‘can simply 
(and accurately) infer a person’s race’ (165). Whereas racialization previously revolved 
around the ‘visibility of race’, the technique of formatting ‘coded histories of phenotypical 
difference into differential data categories’ and in the process facilitated new forms of dis-
crimination like redlining (145, 165).  
The second part of the book draws on these historical insights to bolster his overall 
account of infopolitics. In addition to fleshing out concepts like ‘formatting’ and ‘fas-
tening’, Koopman defends the idea that infopower should be classified as a distinct ana-
lytic of power. Whilst there is an obvious temptation to think the politics of information 
in terms of disciplinary power or biopower, Koopman insists that ‘contemporary infor-
mational assemblies exhibit a modality of power’ that needs to be understood on its own 
terms (14). A great deal of chapter four is dedicated to distinguishing infopower not only 
from Foucault’s own analytics of power (disciplinary, sovereign, bio-) but also ‘other pow-
ers of data’ such as Deleuze’s ‘control power’ and Harcourt’s ‘expository power’ (161 – 
167). In short, Koopman’s argument relies on the suggestion that formatting is a specific 
‘technique’ of power that is exercised through the ‘operation’ of fastening. Whilst this 
process is clearly related to other modalities of power, he maintains that this specific tech-
nique and operation belong to a ‘layer’ of power that is irreducible to any other layer (42). 
Against competing theories of power in media studies, Koopman argues that we must 
resist the pervasive ‘avant-gardism’ that treats our current politics of data as emerging 
only with the advent of new media (169). According to Koopman, this misconception is 
based on a failure ‘to confront the scale at which we have been invested by information 
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for more than a century’ (169). In reality, the basic dynamics of infopower were estab-
lished long before concerns were raised about social media and state surveillance (169).   
Whilst Koopman’s overall account of infopolitics is compelling, his claim that we are 
living under a ‘data episteme’ is more controversial (160). According to Koopman, this 
data episteme has transformed information into a ‘formidable mode of rationality by 
which entire domains of knowledge are made possible’ (160). On this view, we are be-
holden to an ‘epistemology’ that treats information as ‘a sufficient premise for other in-
formation’ and under which ‘the need for more and more data is the spawn of data itself’ 
(160). It’s plausible to say that infopower is characterized by a distinctive mode of ration-
ality that grants an unwieldly epistemic authority to information. However, Koopman 
doesn’t offer us much reason to think that our episteme has been transformed – at least, 
not in the sense that Foucault uses the term. For Foucault, the episteme is not merely the 
way knowledge is circulating and being produced, but refers to the historical conditions 
of possibility that determine the intelligibility of statements as truth claims.1 It is one thing 
to say that data is shaping the production of knowledge, and quite another to say it has 
altered the episteme itself. Koopman’s claim seems especially contentious when we con-
sider Foucault’s insistence that  
In any given culture and at any given moment, there is always only one episteme that 
defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge, whether expressed in a theory or 
silently invested in a practice.2  
If there really is a new episteme that has emerged through our informational practices, this 
would constitute a significant transformation of the conditions of possibility that defined 
knowledge in the modern episteme. It appears unlikely that Koopman would want to make 
such a strong claim and, consequently, one suspects he is using the term rather loosely. 
However, this makes it difficult to determine the precise extent to which he thinks 
knowledge has been transformed by data. In any case, it would be interesting to see him 
develop this concept in more detail.   
The book’s final chapter focuses on the deficiencies of both ‘information theory’ and 
‘communicative theories’ of democracy in understanding the politics of data (173 – 195).  
Koopman argues that the tradition of information theory inaugurated by Shannon and 
Wiener ‘was in actuality a theory of communication that simply assumed information as 
its given starting point’ (181). This leads Koopman to declare that ‘information theory is 
really communication theory’ and that it desperately needs to attend to the history of in-
formation if it wants to provide a satisfying account of the relationship between infor-
mation and politics (181, 184). Similarly, he argues that the theories of democracy put for-
ward by Habermas and Dewey ‘presuppose’ information as the basis of communication 
and are therefore unable confront ‘the functional role’ that information plays within a 
modern democratic society (181).   
 
1 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, (2002), 211 – 212.  
2 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, (1973), 168.  
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At the end of the book, Koopman briefly considers what it would mean ‘to mount re-
sistance to a politics of information’ (193). He argues that meaningful resistance will re-
quire attention to information as a political problem in its own right. Whilst he doesn’t 
offer many concrete suggestions for how this resistance might be carried out, he argues 
that it will involve reformatting the data and redesigning the technologies that constitute 
us as informational persons (194). This, in turn, will require us to investigate how these 
‘forms and formats’ have developed historically in order to diagnose their contingent fea-
tures and flaws (195). Therefore, his hope is that the kind of historical work he does in this 
book will serve as a starting point for ‘a resistance of occupation, contestation, and trans-
formation’ (193).   
Koopman’s book represents an early confrontation with a new frontier of power – alt-
hough, as he would insist, one that is much older than most of us would have imagined. 
Rigorous, well-argued and incisive, How We Became Our Data should be considered essen-
tial reading for anyone interested in media studies or the politics of data. It also serves as 
an impressive model for how we can use genealogy to uncover new modalities of power 
and, in doing so, avoid the trap of just regurgitating Foucault’s insights, paying lip service 
to his methods and appropriating history to reinforce our existing beliefs.  
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